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Author: Lindsay Garrett
This article discusses the admissibility of repressed memory evidence in sexual abuse
cases. It postures that current treatment of such evidence exemplifies the continued lack of
understanding society has of how harshly sexual abuse impacts victims. Analysis focuses on
whether discovery rules should toll statutes of limitations, whether or not “discovery” has
occurred, whether or not courts should admit repressed memory evidence, and, if so, the
applicable standard of proof needed to prove the abuse.
These issues require careful scrutiny of a variety of competing concerns. Proponents of
the use of repressed memory evidence focus on the need for victims to have their day in court,
and the difficulty victims have proving sexual abuse. Opponents, on the other hand, focus on
defendants’ right of repose and the unreliability of repressed memory evidence. After comparing
these various concerns, the article concludes that state legislatures should create statutory
schemes that better balance competing concerns and that better predict the treatment of repressed
memory evidence in court.
In addition to these concerns, much of the repressed memory debate centers on whether
the victim recovered the memory spontaneously or via a therapeutic trigger method. With this in
mind, the article suggests that statutory schemes could better balance the competing concerns by
treating spontaneously recovered memories with more leniency than therapeutically recovered
memories.
To delineate this argument, the article compares the current New York statutory scheme
to the current California statutory scheme. It contends that California’s scheme provides a solid
starting point and model for other states to follow and expand upon, while challenging New
York’s scheme as far too imbalanced against victims.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Sexual abuse is by no means a new crime afflicting society, and it has certainly received
increased attention in recent decades.1 In spite of such increased attention, society remains
backward-minded, failing to grasp the severity of psychological trauma sexual abuse victims
endure. Treatment of various types of evidence during the litigation of sexual abuse cases, such
as repressed memory evidence, illustrates this lack-luster attitude. Repression of memory occurs
when ideas, perceptions, and memories of past trauma are forced into the unconscious. 2
Memory recovery can then occur spontaneously or with the help of various therapeutic
techniques. Despite that recovered memory evidence allows victims otherwise barred by statutes
of limitations to bring claims of sexual abuse, such evidence still receives a great deal of
criticism.
Victims face three main hurdles when they bring sexual abuse lawsuits. First, they must
get past the applicable statute of limitations, which requires a determination of not only whether
a discovery rule will apply to toll the statute of limitations, but also what constitutes “discovery.”
Second, victims must obtain a favorable ruling on the admissibility of recovered memory
evidence. And finally, once admitted into court, victims must adequately prove the abuse
according to the applicable standard of proof.
State legislatures could do a great deal more to ensure that victims navigate these hurdles
with greater ease. Current approaches to application of discovery rules, rulings on admissibility,
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and application of standards of proof do not create enough predictability or consistency. While
recovered memories do inherently contain an element of unreliability, legislatures should avoid a
wholesale prohibition of recovered memory evidence. Statutes should exist to allow application
of delayed discovery doctrines to all cases involving recovered memories. However, to help
balance the aforementioned concerns, legislatures should then distinguish between
therapeutically and spontaneously recovered memories, when delineating what exactly triggers
“discovery.” That is, instances of spontaneous recovery should not trigger “discovery” as easily
as instances of therapeutic recovery would. Beyond making a determination as to whether or not
“discovery” has been triggered, judges should not hold any further gate-keeping power. Instead
statutes should allow all recovered memory evidence into the courtroom for the jury to evaluate.
Once inside the courtroom, legislatures should again distinguish between spontaneously and
therapeutically recovered memories when delineating applicable standards of proof. Statutes
should hold victims who recovered memory of abuse spontaneously to a lower standard of proof
than victims who recovered memory of abuse via therapeutic techniques.
II. HISTORY OF SEXUAL ABUSE
History shows the continual discovery and rediscovery of sexual abuse; however, only in
recent decades has society begun to recognize and publicly expose cases of sexual abuse. Dr.
Roland Summit’s statement from 1988 portrays a more traditional outlook of sexual abuse:
“There is a sad, self-preserving irony about a world that cannot see its own cruelty with victims
who can’t give voice to their pain. After 125 years of discarded enlightenment, we still act as if
victims are freaks and as if it is a virtue to be ignorant of sexual victimization.” 3 People may
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have always accepted the possibility that sexual abuse can occur, but it remains debatable that
people accept the reality that it actually does occur; especially the prevalence with which it
occurs. Let us say that a person’s friend or family member is a victim of sexual abuse. Would
this change his look-the-other-way mentality towards the crime? This question remains
debatable today just as it did prior to three decades ago. In fact, during the first seven decades of
the 20th century, little was written about sexual abuse. Scholars did not consider rape and sexual
abuse topics worth writing about.4 When writings produced, they were filled with skepticism
and fear, and downplayed the seriousness of the issue.5 Before 1975, articles pertaining to rape
and sexual abuse focused largely on the fear of fabricated allegations.6 Even as far back as Sir
Matthew Hale, who served as Chief Justice of the Court of King’s Bench in England for several
years a couple centuries ago, and who did not appear to have undue skepticism of women
alleging rape wrote, “It must be remembered, that rape is an accusation easily to be made and
hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, though never so innocent.”7
For generations afterward, law review authors and judges continued to quote this statement by
Hale during discussions of sexual offenses. It is understandable that skepticism of sexual
offenses should exist. However, the level of skepticism seen prior to 1975 went far beyond
moderation.8
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Due to the lack of documentation on sexual abuse before 1975, little is known about the
prosecution of such cases prior to this time.9 One study done at the beginning of the 21st century
by John E. B. Myers, Susan E. Diedrich, Devon Lee, Kelly Fincher, and Rachel M. Stern
examined 463 appellate opinions of sexual abuse cases between 1900 and 1950. This study
shows a steady but modest increase in the volume of sexual abuse prosecution between 1900 and
1950, with very few occurring between 1900 and 1910.10 These appellate decisions from 1900
to 1950 show less skepticism toward victims of sexual abuse than expected,11 however, the study
only examines appellate opinions. Thus, the study does not make clear whether or not the trial
courts showed the same lack of skepticism.12
After 1975, the country witnessed the birth of the women’s rights movement and the
victims’ rights movement, an increase in science, and a more modern idea of child protection.
As a result, much more documentation of the subject exists from the past few decades.13 In
addition, the prevalence of sexual abuse cases increased significantly during the 1980’s and
1990’s.14 However, the increase in written material and the resulting increase in awareness have
not necessarily reduced the skepticism that has historically pervaded this area.15 For example, in
2002 prosecutors in Oregon dropped their case against a victim’s father when she spoke up about
other sexual abuse by her neighbor. They felt that her accusations against the neighbor created
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“evidence of past sexual behavior” that her father’s attorney would be able to use against her.16
In another Oregon case, school officials waited three to four years after hearing several underage
girls complain of sexual abuse by their music instructor before calling the police in 1999.17 Also,
in 1999 Sports Illustrated did a special report on sexual abuse in youth sports.18 This article
focused particularly on a Little League coach from San Bernardino, California who received an
84 year prison sentence after pleading guilty to sexually abusing five children under his
instruction between 1990 and 1996.19 Prior to this case he received a sentence of up to seven
years at a state mental hospital for molesting other children.20 He estimates that he molested
several hundred children over 30 years.21 When parents of the San Bernardino Little League
found out about his past of sexual abuse, they tried to inform Little League officials.
Unfortunately, the perpetrator convinced them that he had changed his ways and that they had
nothing to worry about.22 These examples clearly demonstrate the continued skepticism and
ignorance of today, as summarized in the 1999 Sports Illustrated article: “Societal ignorance
about the nature of pedophilia is another thing that keeps victims from coming forward…society
doesn’t understand what happened to them, doesn’t understand the seduction process.”23
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As sexual abuse prosecution and litigation has increased during the past few decades, so
too has professional and scientific involvement.24 Increased involvement by professionals has
led many to start questioning the truth of sexual abuse allegations, suggesting that many
allegations have a basis in weak or flawed evidence. For example, in 1987, E.P. Benedeck and
D.H. Schetky wrote:
Child psychiatrists, pediatricians and mental health professionals have recently been
concerned by a deluge of referrals requesting evaluation of young children in regard to
allegations of sexual abuse. A new cottage industry/profession has evolved and a group
of experts in this specialist area have emerged to fill a serious need. Many of these
experts, although well meaning, seem to be self-proclaimed and biased, always finding
sexual abuse where alleged.25
With the increased involvement of professionals came an increased involvement by the
scientific community. As the general public became more aware of the prevalence of sexual
abuse, research in the field has increased26 such that the “general scientific research
community”27 no longer has the same degree of skepticism regarding sexual abuse allegations.
Over time researchers have concluded that sexual abuse is by no means uncommon, that children
of certain social status and from certain family situations have a greater risk of sexual abuse, and
that exposure to sexual abuse can be linked to mental health issues and other problems later in
life. These conclusions have led to even further awareness by the public of sexual abuse.28
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Along with the increased scientific involvement, courts began seeing the introduction of
expert testimony in sexual abuse cases.29 This phenomenon also came about as part of the post
1980 reform era.30 Of the 463 cases evaluated in the study done by Myers, et al., none between
1900 and 1950 involved use of experts by the prosecutors.31 The idea of using experts from the
mental health profession stemmed from the lack of evidence that generally existed in sexual
abuse cases.32 Even today, significant debate centers on the appropriateness of these experts
because some issues relating to sexual abuse are not yet beyond doubt and question.33
III. DEVELOPMENT OF REPRESSED MEMORY SYNDROME
a. Introduction
As previously mentioned, repression of memory occurs when a person forces memories
associated with trauma from their conscious to their unconscious.34 Victims do not forget these
memories, rather they stow the memories away elsewhere for later discovery. Unlike
suppression of memory, where victims remain aware of the traumatic memory but choose to
avoid it by shoving it aside in their mind, repression of memory occurs when the memory is
actually “inaccessible to the conscious mind.” Repression of memory does not destroy the
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memory, rather, the memory later requires stimuli to re-appear in the conscious mind.35 As it
can often take quite a while for these memories to re-surface in the conscious mind, the theory of
repressed memory relies on the idea that victims have not always had awareness of the injury.36
Most psychologists buy into the theory that the human mind can actually repress
memories.37 In 1896 Sigmund Freud first proposed the idea that memories do actually last a
long time but that the human mind will bury certain traumatic memories as a defense
mechanism. He extended this theory to suggest that in particular the human mind can repress
memories that cause anxiety, such as childhood abuse. Most therapists and psychoanalysts
accept Freud’s idea about repressed memories;38 an idea he describes as slowly excavating a
“buried city…layer by layer.”39
b. The Repressed Memory Debate
The debate about repressed memory evidence stems less from a lack of belief that people
can actually repress memories and instead from whether these repressed memories, once
recovered, have enough reliability.40 Evaluation of repressed evidence has to balance the need to
protect victims of abuse with the need to protect individuals from false accusations.41 Opponents
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worry about reliability of recovered memories because the idea of repression has basis only in
unsubstantiated speculation and anecdotal evidence. Proponents, on the other hand, feel that
recovered memories do have scientific validity and accuracy, and that regardless, many mental
health theories are difficult to prove with empirical evidence. In particular, these proponents
argue that gathering empirical evidence of repressed memory would be nearly impossible,
practically and ethically, because it would require exposing victims to extreme trauma. 42
Specifically, opponents find issue with the various trigger methods for recovering
repressed memories. Some triggering mechanisms cause spontaneous resurfacing, while other
mechanisms draw out the memories over time. Spontaneous triggers include flashbacks, fleeting
glances, surprise memories, or other stimuli. Opponents of repressed memory evidence have less
of an issue with recovery of memories via one of these spontaneous triggering methods because
the likelihood of memory implantation dramatically decreases in such instances. These
opponents become less happy with spontaneously recovered memories when people
subsequently seek therapy to help “draw out the repressed memories more fully.”43
Therapy induced memory recovery causes even more speculation and dispute.44 The most
common devices used in therapy to draw out repressed memories include guided imagery and
hypnosis.45 Hypnosis involves artificially inducing a state of sleep or trance. Guided imagery, a
42
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form of hypnosis, involves starting with known facts and then guiding a person towards a
purported factual base. 46

Other devices also include group therapy, books, and

questionnaires.47 Opponents claim issue with such devices because they fear there is too much
risk of implantation of false memories.48 In addition to concern of false implantation of
memories, opponents worry about the suggestibility of witnesses and distortion of recovered
memories by filling in memory gaps with false details.49 Such opponents fear that therapists aim
to heal patients and in doing so have a tendency of too easily labeling symptoms as results of
early childhood sexual abuse.50 Moreover, opponents worry that the “absolute belief or
conviction in the accuracy of the therapeutically induced memory”51 will create ineffective
cross-examination.52
The concern over implantation of false memories led individuals who had been wrongly
accused of sexual abuse to form the False Memory Syndrome Foundation (FMS) in 1992.
Interestingly, however, even supporters of FMS believe that humans can repress memories but
argue that many times people falsely claim to have recovered memories of abuse.53

46

Id, at 523-524.

47

Johnson, at 946.

48

Id, at 941.

49

Eisenberg, Matthew J., Comment, Recovered Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse: The Admissibility Question,

68 TEMPLE L. REV. 249, 261 (Spring 1995).
50

Johnson, at 947.

51

Richmond, at 526.

52

Eisenberg, at 262.

53

Johnson, at 949.

13

IV. IMPACT OF DISCOVERY RULES AND STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS ON CASES
INVOLVING REPRESSED MEMORY
a. Statute of Limitations and Discovery Rules
The hot debate over recovered memories centers on a few main issues involved in sexual
abuse lawsuits. First, it must be determined whether or not the claim will be barred by the
applicable statute of limitations. Due to the basic idea behind repressed memory that victims
remain unaware of any injuries from sexual abuse until the memory is recovered, the question of
whether or not this unawareness should prevent the statute of limitations from running must be
determined.54
Typically a statute of limitations will begin running at the time the injury occurs,
regardless of whether the victim is aware of the injury. Sexual abuse claims differ slightly in that
statutes of limitation do not run until after the victim turns eighteen. Frequently in sexual abuse
claims the victim will not remember the trauma until after the statute of limitation has run, which
would ordinarily mean that the victim would not have a claim.55 Proponents argue the unfairness
to victims of this kind of approach, saying that those accused gain an “unfair advantage by strict
application of a limitations time bar.”56 Thus, the importance of victims having their day in court
must then be weighed against the importance of defendants’ right of repose in order to determine
whether or not statutes of limitation should toll until memory of the abuse occurs.57 Devices
such as discovery rules will do just this. These rules say that when there is delayed discovery of
54
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the cause of action, the statute of limitation does not run until the cause of action has been
discovered.58
b. Current Applications of Discovery Rules
In deciding whether to toll a statute of limitations in a repressed memory case by
applying a delayed discovery rule, a court must weigh the interest of plaintiffs in having their
day in court with the defendant’s interest in planning for the future without constant worry of
liability. Most civil cases involving repressed memories do not reach the appellate level. Most
state courts, however, find that the interest of the plaintiffs’, as well as the need to deter sexual
abuse, outweigh the interests of defendants’, and as such, allow application of delayed discovery
rules in cases involving repressed memories.59 In other words, courts liberally apply discovery
rules to repressed memory cases because to do otherwise would leave victims without any
recourse for awful crimes such as sexual abuse.60
The discovery doctrine has received a wide range of interpretations. Some states have
actually rejected the doctrine entirely when applied to repressed memory cases.61 Narrower
interpretations have required victims to show proof of the abuse in order to toll the applicable
statute of limitations.62 Courts that take these narrow approaches in cases of repressed memory
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seem to focus on the strength of the evidence when interpreting discovery rules. These courts
seem to look farther out towards the trial and assess the evidence that is likely to come in to
support a claim of abuse before determining whether or not to allow the applicable discovery
rule to toll the statute. In other words, when it appears that the victim has solid evidence to
prove his or her allegations courts seem more inclined to allow the discovery rule to toll the
applicable statute of limitations.
Since many courts will actually apply discovery rules in cases involving repressed
memory, the issue typically becomes determining what constitutes “discovery,” so as to kick in a
delayed discovery rule and toll the statute of limitations. Victims argue for delayed discovery in
a couple different ways. For example, some argue that they repressed the memories of abuse
from their conscious recall until after the expiration of the statute of limitations, while others
argue that they did not make a connection between the abuse and their present problems until
after the statute of limitations expired.63
Unfortunately for plaintiffs, states that allow application of discovery rules apply a
myriad of approaches rather than maintaining a consistent application of the doctrine. As a
result, even with clear discovery rules on the books, victims cannot know for sure whether or not
they will receive their day in court. Most broad interpretations of the discovery doctrine require
varying degrees of knowledge on the part of victims. For example, some states require that
victims show that they could not have made the causal connection between the abuse and the
effects of the abuse even after “reasonable care and diligence.”64 Other states hold that the statute
God, 334 S.C. 150, 173 (Ct. App. 1999), the court held that a victim must show “independently verifiable objective”
evidence and “expert opinion testimony.”
63
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of limitations will run as soon as the victim becomes aware of the abuse, irrespective of whether
or not the victim has knowledge of the causal connection.65 And still others will toll the
applicable statute of limitation until the victim has both knowledge of the abuse and knowledge
of causation.66
Discovery of the actual abuse means that the victim completely repressed the memory,
while discovery of causation means that the victim had awareness of the abuse but just had not
discovered the link between current psychological issues and the abuse until later. As such,
courts tend to prefer setting the “discovery” time to the time at which the victim discovers the
actual abuse (complete repression) as opposed to the time at which the victim discovers the
causal connection.67 Requiring knowledge of causation in addition to knowledge of the abuse
itself makes it more likely that “discovery” will occur much later and thus toll the statute of
limitation longer.
V. RELIABILITY OF REPRESSED MEMORY
a. Standards Applied to Scientific and Quasi-Scientific Based Expert Testimony
Once a claim of sexual abuse survives the applicable statute of limitations, the victim
must then deal with admissibility of recovered memory evidence into the courtroom.68 To make
this determination, the reliability of recovered memory must be examined. As this type of
evidence will come into court through expert testimony, analysis of reliability begins by looking
at the typical standards applied to expert testimony. Unfortunately, evaluation of scientific
expert testimony does not receive an abundance of guidance from case law, federal evidence
65
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rules, or the various state evidentiary rules. As of 1923, and up until 1975 when the Federal
Rules of Evidence went into effect, courts followed the standard for evaluating scientific
evidence as set forth in Frye v. United States.69 Under Frye, courts deem such evidence reliable
if it has gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.70
This general acceptance test began to lose some footing at the same time the Federal
Rules of Evidence came into play,71 although, many states still apply the Frye standard.72 To
summarize, the Federal Rules of Evidence require relevancy, which means that the evidence
must tend to make the existence of an event or fact “more or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.”73 In addition, even if relevant, the evidence cannot be unfairly prejudicial
so as to substantially outweigh any probative value of the evidence.74 With regard to expert
testimony, courts require reliability as well as relevancy. Sufficient reliability exists if sufficient
facts or data support the testimony and if reliable principles and methods were used and applied
to specific facts of the case at hand.75
Federal Rule of Evidence §702 did little, if anything, to clarify the standard for scientific
evidence.76 Courts at the time had split views on whether to apply the general acceptance test of
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Frye or the relevance based test set forth in §702.77 As a result of this split, various tests
focusing on the reliability aspect of scientific evidence began to emerge.78 While these
reliability tests took hold, courts began evaluating Frye again, reformulating it to address the
reliability issue.79 At the same time, courts applying supposedly stricter reliability tests
continued allowing in questionable testimony, leading to an increased battle over “junk
science.”80 Critics of such evidence began pushing for a stricter version of Frye that would look
behind the scenes at the methodology of the science testified to.81 Eventually, the Supreme
Court answered their call, coming down with Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,82
which put forth a multi-prong approach to the evaluation of the reliability of expert testimony.
These prongs include whether or not the technique is generally accepted in the scientific
community, the rate of error for the technique used, whether the theory is falsifiable, whether the
theory has been subjected to peer review and publication, and whether standards exist to evaluate
the technique.83 These factors are not definitive; courts can look at other factors as well.
Essentially Daubert meant that the court must evaluate the trustworthiness of the expert and the
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probativeness of the studies / data to the issues of the case.84 In other words, Daubert made the
Frye standard only one of the multiple prongs to evaluate expert testimony by establishing new
guidelines to replace the general acceptance test from Frye.85
The development of Daubert also opened the door to a stricter evaluation of less
scientific or quasi-scientific evidence; a category containing syndrome evidence such as
repressed memories.86 Many Frye jurisdictions would not apply Frye’s general acceptance test
to non-scientific evidence, however, once Daubert came along, quasi-scientific evidence could
not necessarily escape stricter analysis anymore. In fact it is rare that courts do not allow
Daubert to apply to this less scientific or quasi-scientific evidence.87 Furthering the effect of
Daubert on the evaluation of scientific evidence, the Supreme Court held in General Electric Co.
v. Joiner88 that courts may analyze not only the general methodology of the science, but also the
expert’s reasoning.89

In addition, the case of Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. V. Carmichael90 established

that Daubert’s reliability test also applies to non-scientific evidence.91
Despite all this tightening by Daubert and subsequent cases of the standard applied to
expert testimony pertaining to both scientific and unscientific evidence, many states comprising
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almost half of the United States population still apply a Frye standard.92 Many states that have
not adopted a Frye standard have also not adopted Daubert or the subsequent rule from Kumho
Tire.93 Thus it remains unclear that Daubert and Kumho Tires actually apply in state court.94
With most sexual abuse cases arising in state courts, this creates a less than clear idea as to the
standard that should apply to repressed memory evidence.
The split among Frye jurisdictions as to whether the general acceptance test should apply
to the general methodologies or the conclusions of the expert further muddies the waters.95
Instead of focusing on one or the other of these approaches, many Frye jurisdictions have instead
chosen to focus on the reasoning behind the expert’s conclusions; a nod towards Joiner.96
Evaluation of the expert’s reasoning leans toward applying Frye tests beyond just scientific
evidence, but many Frye jurisdictions still claim that it does not apply to non-scientific evidence,
such as testimony based on knowledge or experience, or social science evidence. Syndrome
evidence, however, largely remains the exception to the rule that Frye does not apply to social
science evidence.97 Typically the rationale for not applying Frye to social science evidence
stems from the belief that unlike other scientific evidence, social science evidence will not
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necessarily appear infallible to jurors.98 The fact that syndrome evidence remains the exception
to the rule seems to indicate an underlying assumption or belief that jurors will not necessarily
assume fallibility of all social science evidence.
b. Admissibility of Repressed Memory Evidence
Unfortunately very little guidance by state courts exists regarding standards applied
specifically to admissibility of repressed memory evidence in civil cases. That is, states apply a
variety of standards without any real consensus as to what the best standard should be. Some
courts apply a “per se excludable test”99 out of concern over suggestibility and reliability of
repressed memory evidence. Application of this test requires looking to the Frye standard. 100
As previously discussed, this requires looking at only one of the prongs of Daubert; whether or
not the theory has gained general acceptance in the scientific community. Opponents who argue
for a Daubert standard suggest that repressed memory fails multiple prongs of the test set forth in
Daubert. They suggest that memory repression cannot be tested, and that without independent
corroboration it can be easily falsified. In addition, these opponents feel that the anecdotal
information available on repressed memories has not been subject to peer review. These
opponents continue on to argue that regardless, Federal Rule of Evidence 403 would exclude
such evidence due to its unfairly prejudicial nature.101 Such arguments under a Daubert
approach fall short under a Frye-based approach because Frye does not require analyzing these
things. The “per se excludable test” also falls flat, however, because Daubert did overrule Frye
98

Id.

99

Foster, E. A., Comment, Repressed Memory Syndrome: Preventing Invalid Sexual Abuse Cases in Illinois, 21 S.

ILL. U. L. J. 169, 176 (Fall 1996).
100

Id.

101

Richmond, at 565.

22

and it is not clear which standard will apply to expert testimony. As such, since the “per se
excludable test” rests on application of a Frye standard, it rests on shaky ground.102
Another approach allows all repressed memory into evidence. This “total admissibility”
approach allows the jury to evaluate and weigh the credibility of the recovered memory
evidence. Proponents of this approach argue that the jury will be able to properly asses the
credibility via cross-examination. 103 This argument seems to show a belief by proponents of the
“total admissibility” approach that recovered memory testimony is no different in terms of
reliability than any other testimony.
An alternative to both the “per se excludable” and “total admissibility” approaches
includes assessing procedural safeguards followed during the recovery process as part of the
evaluation of the totality of circumstances.104 Under this approach the court will focus on the
procedure involved in obtaining the evidence before the trial begins to determine
admissibility.105 Proponents of requiring certain procedural safeguards argue that these
safeguards serve a dual purpose. That is, they help bolster a victim’s claims of sexual abuse
while minimizing the risk that defendants will have to face false charges.106
Most of the procedures focus on hypnotically induced memory recovery, requiring a
licensed therapist to conduct the hypnosis independent from any police or lawyers, with only the
therapist and victim present. The therapist must record the recollection of the victim both before
102
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and during the hypnosis, preferably via videotape.107 Additional procedural safeguards might
include recording the recollections without adding anything to the descriptions of the victim,
having an impartial therapist conduct the session, limiting the amount of information the subject
receives from the hypnotist, recording the session, and limiting the session to involving only the
subject and the hypnotist.108 Other procedural safeguards take a stricter approach, requiring that
the memory prior to hypnosis be the same as after hypnosis. Proponents of this requirement
argue that without it the memory recovered via hypnosis can be considered tainted.109 An
additional stricter approach focuses on corroboration of the hypnotically recovered memory,
requiring that the recovered memory must be corroborated independently from the hypnosis
procedure.110 Corroboration occurs when a fact is presented that “confirms or supports the
allegation.”111 Regardless of the specific procedural safeguards required, evaluating the totality
of circumstances and requiring such safeguards represents a middle ground between the
exclusion per se and total admissibility approaches.112
This aforementioned variety of approaches exists for both forensically recovered
memories and clinically recovered memories. Forensically recovered memories are typically
used in criminal prosecutions, while clinically recovered memories are used in the civil tort
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context.113 Compared to forensically recovered memories, however, there is much less consensus
from the courts as to which approach to use for clinically recovered memories.114 For
forensically recovered memories, the United States Supreme Court suggests a middle ground
totality of the circumstances standard for evaluation of such evidence.115
Following suit from the approach typically used for forensically recovered memories, the
United States Supreme Court does seem at least to advise against an approach that would
exclude all clinically recovered memories per se.116 Some courts lean towards applying the
middle ground approach involving evaluation of the totality of circumstances.117 Applying the
aforementioned procedural safeguards becomes more difficult with clinically recovered
memories as opposed to forensically recovered memories. That is, many people recover memory
or abuse during therapy irrespective of whether or not any type of litigation will later ensue.
Thus requiring the recording of hypnosis sessions would prove infeasible a great deal of the time.
As such, it has been suggested that instead of passing judgment on recovered memory testimony,
such evidence will be admitted under the evidentiary rules pertaining to expert testimony in
general. The jury can then evaluate the reliability of the evidence under those standards.118
c. Presentation of Repressed Memory Evidence
If repressed memory evidence meets whichever admissibility standard the court decides
to apply, further restrictions exist regarding presentation of the evidence to the jury. For
113

Id, at 250.

114

Id, at 268.

115

Id.

116

Id.

117

Id.

118

Montoya, at 189.

25

example, some courts hold that experts can testify as to their beliefs in the theory of memory
repression and whether or not a victim’s behavior is “consistent with someone who suffers from
repressed memories.” These experts cannot, however, testify as to their opinion of whether or
not the alleged abuse actually occurred.119
In addition, courts might apply different standards of proof to recovered memory
evidence. Often a preponderance of the evidence standard applies to tort claims.120 This
requires a showing that it is more likely than not that the abuse occurred. Some courts, however,
focus on procedural safeguards, namely corroboration, when deciding whether or not to allow
the presentation of recovered memory testimony. This corroboration requirement suggests
showing clear and convincing evidence of the abuse, a higher standard of proof than
preponderance of the evidence, requiring evidence that demonstrates a high probability of truth.
Such corroborative evidence might include proof that a defendant has sexually abused others or
physical proof of abuse to the current claimant. 121
States might also require a higher standard of proof for cases that have involve “crimelike torts” because these kinds of torts have a much more serious nature than most civil cases.122
That is, sexual abuse claims produce serious consequences, including severe financial loss and
damage to the reputation of accused defendants. In addition, judgments against those accused of
sexual abuse often result after the presentation of questionable and unsubstantiated evidence. It
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has been suggested that sexual abuse claims fall into the category of “crime-like torts” and as
such should require a heightened standard of proof.123
VI. PROPOSALS FOR STATUTORY ADJUSTMENTS REGARDING TREATMENT OF
REPRESSED MEMORY EVIDENCE
a. Introduction
States vary a great deal regarding their statutory approach to the issues discussed so far;
many taking a far from adequate approach. On one end of the spectrum sits a state such as New
York, which does not have an extended statute of limitations for sexual abuse claims. New York
addresses statutes of limitations in §§214-215 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules.
On the civil side, these two sections essentially distinguish between claims based on intentional
torts and claims based in negligence, providing a one year statute of limitations for the former124
and a three year statute of limitations for the latter125. In addition to this very basic approach the
statute of limitations for claims based on intentional torts will only toll if the perpetrator has been
charged with a crime126. Insanity or infancy can also occasionally toll the applicable statute of
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limitations127. Other than these very limited examples128, New York does not, either statutorily
or through case law, allow any other mechanisms to toll statutes of limitations. This includes
declining to apply discovery rules to sexual abuse cases involving repressed memory.
On the other end of the spectrum sits a state such as California, which has a much more
comprehensive and victim sensitive approach, as seen in California Civil Code of Procedure
§340.1. Sections (a) through (d) of this statute deal with the application of California’s statute of
limitations. Plaintiffs’ can sue for childhood sexual abuse up until the age of 26 or within three
years of discovering the causal connection between the abuse and the injuries.129 The statute
differentiates, however, between allegations against perpetrators and allegations against other
entities. If a plaintiff sues a defendant other than the alleged perpetrator under a negligence or
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intentional tort theory, it must be established that the defendant “knew or had reason to know” of
the abuse and failed to take reasonable precautionary measures to prevent it.130 If these two
standards are not met, a plaintiff cannot sue non-perpetrator defendants past the age of 26. In
2003 the California state legislature actually opened up the statute for the entire year, allowing
plaintiffs to bring claims otherwise limited by the three year discovery rule.131
Section (f) of this statute goes on to discuss the applicable standards of proof once a
claimant successfully survives the statute of limitation. This section refers to §115 of the Code
of Evidence,132 which states, “Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of proof requires
proof by a preponderance of the evidence.”133
b. Discovery Rules and Statutes of Limitations
States such as New York represent a prime example of society’s lax attitude towards
helping victims of sexual abuse. If state legislatures, such as that in New York, continue to
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remain silent and ignorant to the issues involved in sexual abuse, society will never make
progress in adequately addressing the needs of victims. California, on the other hand, has
demonstrated a much more open mind to the needs of victims. Most states do not adequately
address the backward-minded attitude society continues to have regarding sexual abuse. As
such, the aforementioned California statute represents a great model for other legislatures to
follow when developing their own statutory schemes.
When developing a statutory scheme for treatment of sexual abuse lawsuits, legislatures
should keep in mind the interests of both plaintiffs and defendants. Plaintiffs have a strong
interest in having their day in court, while defendants have an interest in preventing false claims
of abuse. Legislators must acknowledge the valid interests that defendants have in order to
maintain credibility. Distinguishing between therapeutically and spontaneously recovered
memories accomplish this aim. California’s statute does not make such a distinction,
demonstrating that it is merely a starting point for other legislatures.
Instead of simply laying out time limits for when the clock should start ticking for statute
of limitation purposes, statutes should include clear definitions of “discovery,” based on the
method of memory recovery. Limited definitions of “discovery” should apply to claimants who
recover memory spontaneously. These types of claimants have been unaware of the abuse
through no fault of their own, and as such should not suffer more by getting locked out of court.
Such a modification to California’s statute would include a provision stating, “For victims who
recover memory of sexual abuse spontaneously, discovery occurs only after the claimant has a
clear understanding that the abuse occurred, as well as a clear understanding of the causal
connection between the abuse and psychological injuries.” Requiring knowledge of both the
abuse and causation will create a longer window of time for claimants to file suit.
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This more limited definition of “discovery” should only apply in cases of sexual abuse.
Opponents worry that allowing claimants who understand that the abuse occurred, but do not file
suit in time because they do not make the causal connection, to extend the statute of limitations
will render many statutes of limitations ineffective for a wide variety of other tortuous acts. That
is, opponents have concern that if an extended statute of limitations is allowed merely because a
person’s “developmental limitations impaired or precluded their capacity to discover that an
injury resulted from another person's tortuous act” such a standard would allow statutes of
limitations to stay open regardless of whether the tort involved a negligent car accident or
something much more serious.134 Limiting these definitions of “discovery” to cases involving
sexual abuse acknowledges that extended statutes of limitations in some cases would create
inequities for defendants, while also acknowledging the egregious nature of sexual abuse and
that "the injustice of barring meritorious claims before the claimant knows of the injury
outweighs the threat of stale or fraudulent actions.”135
On the other hand, claimants who recover memory of abuse via therapeutic techniques
should have to abide by a broader definition of “discovery.” Such a provision might state, “For
victims who recover memory of sexual abuse via therapeutic techniques, including but not
limited to hypnosis and guided imagery, discovery occurs after the claimant has a clear
understanding that the abuse occurred.” Such a definition will clearly make the triggering of
“discovery” easier for these types of claimants. This distinction between methods of recovery
serves to acknowledge the concerns related to false claims while still giving all claimants a fair
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chance at having their day in court. As long as state legislatures acknowledge valid concerns of
defendants, they can succeed in applying delayed discovery rules in cases of sexual abuse
because they will have greater credibility.
Judges should only determine whether a claimant has discovered the abuse and or the
causation required to trigger “discovery.” Factors to evaluate in determining when the victim
understood that abuse actually occurred should include the age of the victim, the number of years
that have passed since the alleged abuse, and the time at which the victim first shared the abuse
with anyone. Factors to evaluate in determining when the victim understood the causal
connection between the abuse and the psychological effects should include whether and when
the victim sought therapy, as well as whether and when the victim told anyone else about any
psychological effects. In the case of a victim who never told anyone about the abuse and who
never sought therapy, realization of the abuse and causal connection should be deemed to have
occurred when the victim sought legal advice.
Unlike Jorge L. Carro and Joseph V. Hatala who advocate an elimination of statutes of
limitation for all cases of sexual abuse,136 an approach to application of discovery rules that
distinguishes between types of recovery better balances the competing interests of victims and
defendants. Carro and Hatala suggest that complete elimination of all statutes of limitation
would increase the quality of evidence presented at trials because victims would have more time
to gather corroborative evidence. They also suggest that it would decrease the number of
unsubstantiated claims of sexual abuse because plaintiffs would not be racing the clock anymore.
Their approach does nothing to alleviate concerns that opponents of recovered memory have
because it does nothing to distinguish between how victims might recover their memories.
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Sexual abuse cases will not often involve eye witnesses or other solid evidence, but will instead
often rest on evidence such as recovered memories. Carro and Hatala seem to suggest that
eliminating the statute of limitations will allow plaintiffs more time to gather proof to
substantiate and corroborate their claims. However, a recovered memory is a recovered
memory; it will not become more reliable just because the plaintiff has no time limit within
which to file suit.
Others have presented different victim-friendly approaches to application of discovery
rules. For example, Gregory Gordon suggests enacting legislation that focuses entirely on
discovery of all the elements of abuse, rather than making distinctions between victims who
remember or repress memories of abuse.137 Where this suggestion does certainly favor victims
by saying that “discovery” only occurs after the victim has recovered memory of all the elements
of the abuse, it allows for too much argument by opponents. Gordon’s approach does not
distinguish between methods of recovery. Under his approach the statute of limitations would
toll equally for victims who recovered memory of abuse through hypnosis and those who
recovered memory of the abuse spontaneously. As such, it takes into account none of the
concerns regarding hypnotically induced memories of abuse.
Application based on the type of recovery method in play, on the other hand, creates a
much better compromise of the competing interests because it makes an attempt to weed out less
credible claims without making it impossible for victims to have their day in court. As such,
opponents of recovered memories lose some of their ammunition against this type of evidence.
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In addition, such an approach adds greater predictability for claimants trying to determine
whether or not they survived the applicable statute of limitations.
c. Admissibility
Evaluating whether discovery has been triggered should mark the last role judges plays in
sexual abuse cases. That is, once past the statute of limitations hurdle, victims should have the
freedom to present all recovered memory evidence to the jury. Distinguishing between
spontaneous and therapeutically recovered memories during the “discovery” phase has already
served to weed out less credible claims of sexual abuse. As such, victims should receive more of
a break from an evidentiary perspective once they make it into the courtroom. Codification of
total admissibility will provide consistency for sexual abuse cases while also acknowledging that
sexual abuse claims do not typically involve direct evidence of abuse. These claims typically
come down to a “he-said-she-said” situation. If a victim has buried the memories of abuse, he or
she will have no other way to fight the legal battle if he or she cannot testify to the repressed
memories.
Admitting all recovered memory evidence will not result in inequities to defendants
because the jury still has to evaluate this evidence according to applicable standards of proof. In
order to make progress in addressing the true horror of sexual abuse, courts and society must
take some risk. That is, society must have confidence in the jury system to catch any false
claims. Juries do not lack guidance when they evaluate evidence. Cross-examinations
conducted by defense attorneys help the jury evaluate the credibility of the victim as well as any
testimony or evidence offered on behalf of the victim.
d. Standard of Proof

34

As stated previously, some have suggested that courts should adopt a higher standard of
proof because of the “crime-like” nature of sexual abuse tort claims; particularly those involving
recovered memories.138 This approach requires making a distinction based on the criminal
nature of between various types of torts. Unfortunately, such a distinction will create a fuzzy and
unfair line because some torts may have both non-criminal and criminal similarities. In addition,
such an approach completely disregards the differentiation in facts that can exist from one
repressed memory case to the next. For instance, while one case might involve spontaneous
memory recovery, another might involve therapy-induced memory recovery. When a victim
spontaneously recovers memory of abuse it seems unfair to inflict a harsher than normal standard
of proof because arguably fewer reliability issues exist as compared to the victim who recovers
memory via therapeutic techniques. Thus, clumping all recovered memory cases into one
category would not treat all claimants fairly.
Instead, as previously mentioned in Section VI (b) of this paper, state legislatures should
apply different standards of proof based on whether the claim involves spontaneous or
therapeutically induced memory recovery. Such an approach would serve to weed out less
credible claims of sexual abuse while not denying claimants their day in court. Distinctions
based on the type of memory recovery involved at the beginning of the process with statutes of
limitations and discovery rules, combined with the same approach at the end with standards of
proof, nicely book-ends the more relaxed total admissibility standard.
Such an approach in the standard of proof setting might include applying a higher
standard to claimants who recover memories of abuse via therapeutic techniques while applying
a regular preponderance of evidence standard to those who recover memories spontaneously.
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This kind of split acknowledges that victims of sexual abuse will sometimes bury memories of
abuse while also acknowledging that not all recovered memories have equal reliability.
Claimants who recover memories of sexual abuse via therapeutic techniques should have to
show independent corroboration. Sufficient independent corroboration should include proof that
the alleged perpetrator has abused others in the past or testimony from actual eye-witnesses to
the abuse. Other supplemental factors that should come in include journals kept by the victim
before and after recovery of the memories of abuse, and extreme difficulty with gynecological or
physical exams. Obviously these two factors would not suffice alone to prove abuse, however,
the jury should here all of it so as to adequately evaluate the totality of the situation. Regardless
of the standard of proof applied, cross-examination serves to assess credibility of all witnesses.
Thus, a relatively low preponderance of evidence standard does not stand alone as a checkpoint
on recovered memory evidence of the spontaneous nature.
VII. CONCLUSION
Sexual abuse claims involve a myriad of controversial issues; repressed memory
evidence certainly involving no less controversy than other issues. In order to adequately
address the needs of both victims and those accused of abuse, state legislatures need to step in
and get more involved. Legislatures should enact statutes that better deal with the lack of
predictability and consistency that exists with current statutes of limitations, discovery rules, and
standard of proof rules. This paper does not suggest swaying all rules and statutes towards
victims; rather it suggests designing legislation that adequately addresses the lack-luster attitude
society continues to display towards this crime.
Such legislation should acknowledge concerns opponents have so as to erode the footing of
opponents of repressed memory. One way to accomplish these goals involves distinguishing
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cases based on the method of memory recovery, giving greater leeway to those who recovery
memory spontaneously.

37

